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Glossary 
 
BBVA – Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria 
CEGEA – Centro de Estudos de Gestão e Economia Aplicada 
FEFSS – Fundo de Estabilização Financeira da Segurança Social 
GDP – Gross Domestic Product 
IGFSS – Instituto de Gestão Financeira da Segurança Social, I.P. 
INE – Instituto Nacional de Estatística 
ISS – Instituto da Segurança Social, I.P. 
OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PAYG – Pay-As-You-Go Pension Scheme 
VAT – Value Added Tax 
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Abstract 
 
Despite the existence of many studies regarding shadow economy, literature 
dedicated to study the relation between it and social security systems is almost 
inexistent, partly explained by the hard measurement of the former one and the 
uncertainty of its impact. Thus, this study intends to explore the relation between 
shadow economy and the Portuguese social security system, discussing what 
kind of influence they can have on each other and what consequences arise from 
it. Using data from 1983 to 2015, an econometric model that relates shadow 
economy size with social security expenditure was built. From this study, it was 
possible to conclude that there is statistical evidence to affirm that in Portugal, 
during this period, a growth of social security expenditure exerted a negative 
impact in the shadow economy size.  
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Resumo 
 
Apesar da existência de diferentes estudos sobre a economia paralela, a 
literatura dedicada ao estudo da relação entre esta e os sistemas de segurança 
social é praticamente inexistente, o que pode ser, de certa forma, explicado pela 
sua difícil medição e incerteza do seu impacto. Como tal, este estudo pretende 
explorar a relação entre a economia paralela e o sistema de segurança social 
português, abordando as mútuas influências e as consequências que daí 
possam advir. Utilizando dados do período 1983-2015, foi construído um modelo 
econométrico que relaciona o tamanho da economia paralela com os gastos da 
segurança social. De acordo com este estudo foi possível concluir que existe 
evidência estatística para se poder afirmar que em Portugal, durante o período 
em análise, um aumento dos gastos da segurança social exerceu um impacto 
negativo no tamanho da economia paralela. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Classificação Jel: E26, H55, K42, O17. 
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1. Introduction 
Shadow economy is considered to be a phenomenon that is present in all 
economies, regardless of their development level, and remains as a major 
problem in terms of fiscal, economic and social reasons. Measuring the shadow 
economy proves to be a really challenging task, with a long list of studies using 
different methods to estimate its size and development, being quite difficult to 
judge their reliability since it does not exist any common methodology for 
estimating its dimension. In fact, Amendola & Dell’Anno (2010) give a special 
warning about the difficulty of measurement of this issue, stating that “empirical 
analysis of the shadow economy must be valued very carefully”. 
Besides that, the (un)sustainability of the Portuguese social security system 
has been more and more discussed in the last decades. The pension system has 
faced increasing financial challenges thanks to a combination of several 
economic, social and demographic factors such as unemployment, low fertility 
rates and an increase of the life expectancy, in economies that are increasingly 
exposed to globalization. Overcoming these adversities has been an effort for the 
major part of the developed economies like Portugal, with a mature social security 
system based on a model that is today considered by some authors as financially 
feasible (Rosa, 2013) while some others question its future sustainability (Bravo, 
2016). However, one of the major nefarious factor to the social security systems 
is the shadow economy. Shadow economy, escaping labor regulations, is seen 
by many as a way of earning higher wages while providing employment to a 
sizable portion of the labor force, representing millions of contributions lost by the 
social security system, every year.  
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This paper will focus on the Portuguese case, and more specifically on the 
relation between shadow economy and the Portuguese social security system. 
Even though there are several studies regarding the effects of the shadow 
economy to the State revenue, they end up neglecting its effects on social 
security systems. Therefore, this study pretends to be an important contribution 
to fill an existent gap in the literature, regarding this issue. 
The paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents some of the literature 
review with some insights about the guiding principles of the Social Security 
Systems, with a historical perspective and a general overview about the 
Portuguese system, with a special emphasis on the system sustainability. 
Chapter 3 is dedicated to the shadow economy, in which is studied its definition, 
the reasons for its existence, its causes and consequences and possible 
mitigation solutions. Chapter 4 gives a theoretical resume about the relation 
between the two studied variables, while chapters 5 and 6 do it empirically, 
through an inferential statistical analysis and an econometric study. Finally, 
chapter 7 is dedicated to the conclusions taken about this study and suggestions 
for future research. 
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2. Social Security 
 
2.1. Why do Social Security Systems exist? 
 
The idea of social security and the protection against social risks like 
unemployment, illness or work accidents, was based on family structures and 
religious solidarity, which still subsist nowadays (Matias, 1999). 
Matias (1999) considers that the first social assistance initiatives were the 
mobilization of resources seeking to help individuals with poor means of 
livelihood. These were put in practice in XVI Century, in England and France. 
Back in those days, “being protected” meant to be inserted in a certain territorial 
area or own land, and those who were more exposed to social insecurity factors 
could be supported by different institutions. Until XIX Century, the principle of 
property was basically the dominant way of being protected, since the individual 
who owned some sort of land was considered “socially protected”. Along the 
years, the conceptualization of the social security system and its existence 
reasons suffered several changes. The principle of property started to be 
considered ineffective, as precarious jobs and unemployment started to rise, 
which Matias (1999) refers as problems that were not being solved by the 
mechanisms used until XIX Century, since they were only oriented to problems 
regarding work incapacity. 
With the industrial revolution and the rise of salaried workers, Bismark 
imposed a social insurance program in Germany, in order to promote the well-
being of German workers, increase their productivity and begin the construction 
of the welfare state concept as we know nowadays.  
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Arcanjo (1991) and Matias (1999) refer that the insufficiency regarding the 
mutualist sector associated with the expense of the private sector led individuals 
to become less protected or even excluded from any protective system against 
social risks. 
Bismarck created the notion of commutative social protection, by State 
intervention. This concept was mainly focused on protecting personal income and 
was the decisive step that broke with the property principle. By this time, the 
worker started to contribute to a system that protected him instead of saving to 
become an owner of land or property (Matias, 1999). Throughout the years, the 
Bismarckian concept of social protection starts to be recognized as being too 
limited, since it only protected those who were employed instead of giving special 
concern to their social needs. With the need of an increased social protection, 
United Kingdom instituted a mandatory social insurance, in 1911, with what was 
known as “Nation Insurance Act”. The British version was more extensive, even 
though it preserved the Bismarckian concept of social security. With this, the 
distributive social protection concept arises, by increasing public protection and 
risk sharing (Matias, 1999). In 1942, Beveridge wrote a report entitled “Social 
Security and Allied Services”, also known as “Beveridge Report”, in which he 
mentioned that a social security system should be projected to “create a better 
world and ensure all the individuals the satisfaction of their basic needs”. In this 
report, Beveridge expressed three guiding principles. Arcanjo (1991) enumerates 
them with a brief explanation: the principle of universality, considering that all the 
individuals should be covered by some kind of protection, independently of their 
professional situation; the principle of integration, by which a uniform wage should 
be given in form of lump sum benefits; and the principle of unity, seeking the 
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simplification of the benefit mechanisms and the management by a single 
institution. 
Two reasons are appointed by Garcia (2013) as the main factors that explain 
the existence of a social security system nowadays: the first one is related to the 
paternalist role that the State adopts, given the fact that it considers itself as more 
informed and rational than the common citizen, who normally suffers from 
myopia1; the second one is the distributive justice aspect, seeking the 
maximization of the social welfare, which Arcanjo (1991) considers to be the main 
goal of this protection mechanism. 
2.2. Social Security in Portugal 
 
In 1919, emerges the first attempt to create a mandatory social security system, 
intended to promote the public protection of employees who had low wages, by 
creating an entity intended to protect workers in case of illness, invalidity, 
unemployment, oldness and accidents. However, only in 1935, the foundations 
of the current social security system started to be built, even though the system 
coverage was still too limited. The incapacity of the system to deliver an adequate 
retirement income for the elderly led to the introduction of the pay-as-you-go 
(PAYG) financing method (Garcia, 2017). 
Half of a century later, in 1984, the First Social Security Act was published 
(Law no. 28/84), creating a contributive and a non-contributive regime, and a 
social action scheme. The main goal of the contributive system was seeking the 
protection of the employees and their families in case of unemployment, illness, 
incapacity to work and the protection of the population in need, providing them 
                                                                
1 Myopia is referred by Garcia (2013) as the situation in which an individual ignores future events or, 
assuming their probable occurrence, do not give it due importance. 
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the required means of subsistence. While the non-contributive regime had the 
objective of protecting individuals who were not covered by the former one. Article 
63 from the Constitution of Portugal establishes that the State is charged with 
organizing, coordinating and subsidizing a unified and decentralized social 
security system, with the participation of the trade unions, other organizations 
that represent workers and associations that represent the other beneficiaries. 
According to the same article, the social security system shall protect citizens in 
illness and old age and when they are disabled, widowed or orphaned, as well as 
when they are unemployed or in any other situation that entails a lack of or 
reduction in means of subsistence or the ability to work. 
In 2000, the Second Social Security Act is published (Law no. 17/2000), 
renewing the right to the Social Security for everyone, by reinforcing the 
effectiveness, the efficiency and the financial sustainability of the system. The 
system started to be divided in 3 sub-systems: social protection; family protection; 
and welfare. It got revoked in 2002 (Law no. 32/2002), with no major changes. In 
2007 was published the Forth Social Security Act (Law no. 4/2007), which is still 
in effect. It changed the composition of the system, with 3 divisions: citizenship 
social protection, social welfare and complementary. It also introduced the 
sustainability factor related to the increasing life expectancy, which was later 
aggravated in 2013 by the Decree-Law no. 167-E/2013 that also starts to take as 
reference the evolution of the average life expectancy at 65 years. 
Portuguese Social Security is financed through contributions from employers 
and employees, and through government or other public entities’ transfers. The 
non-contributive system is financed by government transfers, as is most of the 
social action (Welfens & Ryan, 2011). 
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2.3. Pension systems in Portugal 
 
Blake (2006) divides pension systems into two different schemes: an unfunded 
state scheme and a private funded pension scheme organized by the employer. 
The former one operates on a PAYG basis2 – employees pay a contribution (out 
of their labor income) that intends to pay for the pensions of retired people, in 
return of a promise that the next generation will do the same, in what is called as 
an intergenerational contract. The latter one consists in the case where 
employees save (out of their labor income) for their future pensions in a specific 
fund, that can be managed and invested in diverse ways, according to each 
individual risk profile/aversion or through corporate pension plans.  
It is difficult to mention which system is more sustainable or effective, 
considering that both present advantages and disadvantages. Brown (2008) 
confirms it – neither system is guaranteed to be more stable than the other. Both 
systems are always dependent on a next generation of workers to produce goods 
and services and pay their own contributions. Alexandre et al (2017) suggests 
that PAYG systems become more advantageous in periods with high economic 
and demographic growth, while fully-funded schemes can become financially 
sustainable in periods of economic stagnation or decline. According to Mendes 
(1995), PAYG systems are especially advantageous in certain conditions – when 
they allow intergenerational transactions and risk-sharing that can create Pareto 
welfare improvements. 
                                                                
2 The required contribution rate is given by Brown (2008) as: 𝐶𝐶 = 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡
∗ 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡
, where 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 is the number of 
pensioners, 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 is the number of active workers (in the formal sector), 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 is the average pension benefit, and 
𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 is the Average Wage upon which contributions are made.  
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Bravo (2016) refers to the Portuguese pension system as a mix between the 
two pension systems referred by Blake (2006), with a dominant mandatory PAYG 
earnings-related defined benefit public scheme, comprising of two separates, but 
convergent schemes, with “incipient voluntary occupational and personal funded 
schemes” that only covers 3.7% of the country’s workforce. Contributory pensions 
are financed on a PAYG basis by social contributions, which besides the 
contributions from the employer and employee, are also complemented by a 
small fraction of the VAT tax. The general scheme establishes a single 
contribution rate at 11% for employees and 23.75% for employers (includes 0.5% 
to cover employment‐related illness).  
It is also important to mention the existence of another funded scheme 
component. To capitalize any surplus that might occur, the Government created 
the Social Security Reserve Trust Fund (FEFSS), in 1989. Whenever this 
happens, the excess funds are transferred to the Trust Fund which currently3 
manages around €14,100M in assets, financed through benefit system surpluses 
and a percentage of between 2% and 4% of obligatory contributions paid by 
employees to the social security system, until the level of assets of the fund 
attains the equivalent value of two years of social security benefits (Garcia, 2014). 
The current asset value corresponds to 119.9% of the annual pension spending 
in Portugal, and 7.9% of the Portuguese GDP (IGFSS, 2017). Garcia (2014) 
emphasizes the importance of the creation of these kinds of pension reserve 
funds to the sustainability of the social security system in the long term, while still 
considering the need for further reform.  
                                                                
3 Data from 31/12/2015. 
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As previously mentioned, in 2007, Portugal negotiated a pension reform 
package with social partners. It included higher pension decrements for 
retirement before age 65 and strengthened financial incentives to continue 
working beyond that age, the indexing of pensions in payment was debased, the 
normal retirement age of public service workers rose from 60 to 65 and a 
sustainability factor was introduced (Hinrichs, 2015) to ensure financial 
sustainability of the system in the face of adverse demographic and economic 
changes (Garcia, 2014). In order to obtain the full old-age benefit, one must have 
contributed for 40 years and fulfil the minimum age requirement. The full old-age 
benefit consists in a weighted calculation of all remunerations throughout a life-
time career. The minimum age requirement is revised each year and is directly 
related to the average life-expectancy so, whenever it increases in a certain year, 
also increases the minimum age to be entitled to the full benefit. In 2017, the 
minimum age for retirement is 66 years and 3 months. Moreover, one can require 
the benefit before the normal age, with a minimum of 60 years old and 40 years 
of career, although with a penalty linking the level of newly awarded pensions to 
increases of longevity.  
According to ISS (2017), the formula of the sustainability factor is the 
following: 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 =  
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉2000
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉2016
 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉2000 corresponds to the average life expectancy in 2000. 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉2016 
corresponds to the average life expectancy in 2016. Hence, the sustainability 
factor represents the ratio between the average life expectancy in 2000 and the 
year before the retirement decision year. 
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There is also a component called Global Formation Rate, which is the number 
of civil years with relevant remunerations to record multiplied by the accrual rate 
presented in Table I which can vary between 2 and 2.3%. 
In sum, the total benefit formula is given by the following whenever before the 
legal retirement age:  
𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻 𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑩𝑻𝑻 = 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝐺𝐺𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 ∗
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹  
2.4. The (un)sustainability of the Social Security System 
 
According to Pereira (1998), a social security system can be considered 
unsustainable if the current level of social security benefits cannot be financed 
given the current social security tax base and contribution rates. Alexandre et al 
(2017) adopts another perspective – In the long-term, the sustainability of a social 
security system can be measured through the concept of implicit debt. 
Considering that workers pay a contribution seeking for a future pension, this can 
be considered as a government bond, in which there is a promise made by the 
State to deliver a certain amount of money in the near future4.  
Demographic factors represent a huge challenge to the sustainability of the 
Portuguese social security system. Life-expectancy has grown substantially from 
67 years in 1970 to 80 years in 2014 and the growth is expected to continue with 
the projection of 90 years by the end of the century. Total fertility rate fell from 
above 3.0 in 1970 to just 1.3 in 2015. While the potential sustainability index, 
which measures how many people between 15 and 64 years exist per each 
elderly, fell from 6.6 in 1970 to 3.2 in 2015. All this combined with a negative 
                                                                
4 The authors affirm that if the pension system was calculated through this perspective, it would correspond 
to several times the current GDP. 
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migration balance since 2011, accelerating even more this process of 
demographic erosion. INE (2017) projections estimate that the Portuguese 
population will fall from 10.3 million to 7.5 million in 2080, with the ageing index5 
doubling from the current ratio of 147 elderlies per 100 youth to 317 elderlies per 
100 youth, in 2080. In addition, the dependency ratio6, which is directly linked to 
the potential sustainability index, is projected to rise rapidly from the current 
31.8% to an impressive 73% in 2080.  
Besides the demographic risks, Schneider (2015) calculated that shadow 
economy had a size of 17.6% in terms of the official GDP, in Portugal, in 2015. 
This represents thousands of people whose contributions are not being made to 
the social security system, with all the economic and social risks that it implies. 
As time passes, more retirees will receive benefits, while there will be relatively 
fewer workers who contribute to the system through payroll taxes on earnings. 
This is particularly serious considering that a major part of the population is 
heavily reliant on their future pension benefits, with only 17.2% of the households 
that have the financial capability to have some sort of financial asset (the savings 
rate was only 4.4%, in 2016), investing in a voluntary pension fund, according to 
a survey carried out by Banco de Portugal (2016). This is partly explained by the 
low wages of a major part of the population and, consequently, low social security 
contributions during their working life — the average old-age monthly pension in 
Portugal was only €3577 in 2015, according to PORDATA. 
                                                                
5 Ageing index is the ratio of the number of elderly persons of an age when they are generally economically 
inactive (aged 65 and over) to the number of young persons (from 0 to 14) 
6 The ratio of the number of elderly persons of an age when they are generally economically inactive (aged 
65 and over) to the number of persons of working age (from 15 to 64). 
7 This amount is below the Portuguese at-risk-of-poverty threshold, which was €5269 per year, in 2015, 
according to INE. 
SHADOW ECONOMY AND THE PORTUGUESE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM. 
12 
 
Overcoming these adversities has been an effort for the major part of the 
developed economies like Portugal, with a mature social security system based 
on a model that is today considered by some authors as financially feasible 
(Rosa, 2013), while some others question its future sustainability (Bravo, 2016). 
Given the mechanism of the system, this led some authors like Tanner (2011) to 
even compare it to a Ponzi scheme.  
In Figure 1, the gap between the social security revenue and expenditures 
since the beginning of the millennium reveals some sustainability improvements. 
However, contributions represent a decreasing share of this revenue, in the last 
decades, as shown in Figure 2, possibly explained by a growth of the 
unemployment and labor force that moved to the informal sector. 
However, the contributive system was still financially solid in 2015, since 
Total Revenue more than covered Total Expenditure, according to Table II. In 
2014, total pension expenditure accounted for 15.7% of GDP and almost 75% of 
all social security expenditure (Bravo, 2016). Meanwhile, shadow economy in 
2015 was 17.6% of GDP, which in absolute figures would be enough, for 
instance, to pay the total contributive system expenditure for approximately two 
years. Table III shows the dimension of the shadow economy in Portugal and how 
it can negatively affect public institutions quality, by decreasing potential tax 
revenue.  
In terms of sustainability, even though Matias (1999) considered that the 
system was becoming more mixed than before, he also considered that it would 
have to quickly move to a more funded based system and do not rely so much 
on a PAYG system which was (and still is) predominant, to become less exposed 
to the adverse effects of low economic growth periods. However, funded pension 
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systems are not immune to economic crises as well, since these suffered 
considerable losses in recent crises like the one in 2008, by being subject to 
financial markets volatility and, consequently, may not be a viable option for 
policymakers when redesigning a social security pension system (Garcia, 2014). 
Nonetheless, Bijlsma et al (2014) concluded that larger funded pension systems 
had a positive effect on economic growth in OECD countries, during the period 
2001-2011. 
The possible unsustainability of the system can be mostly explained by the 
disappearance8 of the additional revenue collected during the demographic 
transition when the working-age population grew rapidly, which is referred by 
Góra (2014) as the demographic dividend, and the proper way of putting aside 
excess contributions in public pension reserves funds. The activities in the 
shadow economy have also a deep impact on the pension system sustainability, 
by reducing the basis for calculating pension contributions and leading to their 
decline, since the unreported employment causes lower bases for calculating the 
pension contributions during the labor activity which lead to a lower initial size of 
the pension. If the increased activities in the black market cause a lower demand 
for workforce in the official economy, and thus a less pay rise and a higher 
unemployment rate, then the rate of pension increase for all pensioners will be 
lower and the dynamics of expenditure will be relaxed (Gankova, 2015). 
Góra (2014) enumerates several possibilities of adjustment to the pension 
system to maintain a proper sustainability which might involve an increase in the 
retirement age or an increase in the contribution/tax rate to finance pension 
expenditures, however, these measures will eventually lead to an increase of the 
                                                                
8 As a result of the change of the demographic structure. 
SHADOW ECONOMY AND THE PORTUGUESE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM. 
14 
 
unemployment and fiscal burden, which, as can be seen further in this study, are 
main driving forces of the shadow economy. Moreover, Silva et al (2004), assume 
that in order to ensure the Portuguese system’s financial sustainability beyond 
2050, it will be necessary to implement modifications such as the introduction of 
an obligatory complementary pension, either in individual or group schemes, 
combined with an establishment of a ceiling for the state pension. All these 
changes imply a high political cost, which is the main reason why politicians 
postpone these kind of decisions, especially when most people know little about 
the mechanisms influencing performance or about the reforms needed to make 
the systems sustainable, making it hard for them to understand why they should 
pay higher contributions or receive lower benefits, while still demanding the same 
level of benefits, leading to what Góra (2014) considers as inflated expectations. 
Nevertheless, these changes should be made on a gradual rate, since too many 
changes in a short period put a strain on the system and are not a solution to the 
financial sustainability problem. Instead, they will probably raise more problems, 
which is particularly explained by an inappropriate level of retirement income 
(Garcia, 2017). 
3. Shadow Economy 
 
3.1. Definition 
 
Shadow Economy, or Underground Economy, is considered to have different 
definitions. Studies that measure and analyze the shadow economy use to have 
some difficulty to find a proper definition and there is no single definition that can 
be considered as the most accurate one. One of the broadest reads as follows: 
“Market-based production of goods and services, whether legal or illegal, that 
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escapes detection in the official estimates of GDP” by Smith (1994), or by 
Dell’Anno (2003) as “those economic activities and the income derived from them 
that circumvent government regulations, taxation or observation”, and finally by 
Schneider (2014) as “all currently unregistered economic activities that contribute 
to the officially calculated Gross National Product”. 
It is possible to observe a clear division between the several components of 
the shadow economy, by looking at Table IV, published by Lippert & Walker (1997), 
where the authors divide the shadow economy into two types of activities, legal 
and illegal, both being divided between monetary and non-monetary transactions 
and differentiating those with tax evasion and tax avoidance. Sam (2010) does a 
similar division, dividing the shadow economy by tax-paying and non-tax-paying 
activities, with the former ones being divided between legal and illegal ones. 
Bairrada & Martins (2008) followed the path of the previous authors, making a 
clear distinction between tax evasion and tax fraud, thus considering that both 
represent some sort of tax avoidance. So, while tax fraud is the adoption of an 
illegal procedure by an individual through ways that are reprehensible and 
punishable, tax avoidance includes all the procedures adopted by the taxpayer 
to minimize taxes, seizing the opportunity of the existence of loopholes in the tax 
law without breaching it. 
It is important to mention that the concept of shadow economy considered in 
this study will only consider the legal production and provision of goods and 
services that are deliberately concealed from public authorities (Schneider, 
2013). As so, illegal underground economic activities, crime activities (such as 
drug dealing, robbery, etc.) and all household services and productions are 
excluded from shadow economy. These kinds of activities are also often excluded 
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from nation accounts, due to the difficulty of estimation, which could limit 
international comparability (Dell'Anno, 2007). This also leads us to the existence 
of overlapping areas, such as prostitution and do-it-yourself activities, which are 
considered by Schneider (2013) as one of the difficulties in presenting 
estimations of the size and development of the shadow economy. 
To explain this issue, Schneider & Buehn (2017) developed the following 
equation: 
𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 [𝑝𝑝− (𝐴𝐴+,𝐹𝐹−);𝑅𝑅−;𝐵𝐵+ (𝑇𝑇+,𝑊𝑊+)] 
Shadow economic activities (SE) negatively depend on the probability of 
detection (p) and potential fines (f), and positively on the opportunity costs of 
remaining formal, denoted as B. The opportunity costs are positively determined 
by the burden of taxation (T) and high labor costs (W). Schneider & Buehn (2017) 
considers that individual income generated in the shadow economy is usually 
categorized as labor income rather than capital income due to labor market 
regulations. The probability of detection is defined as p, which is dependent on 
enforcement actions (A), taken by the tax authority, and on facilitating activities 
(F) accomplished by individuals to reduce detection of shadow economic 
activities. 
3.2. Why does Shadow Economy exist? 
 
Bairrada & Martins (2008) consider that the resistance from the individual to taxes 
goes back to the first civilizations, in a “permanent fight from the individual against 
the depreciation of his patrimony” that taxes can represent. To understand the 
dimension of shadow economy, Gonçalves (2016) compares it to a country, by 
affirming that if shadow economy was a country it would be the second biggest 
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economy in the world, following United States, moving more than 10 trillion dollars 
per year. The existence and growth of the shadow economy can be explained by 
distinct factors, that can differ between countries and economies. The main ones, 
cited by several authors (Schneider & Enste, 2000; Petersen et al, 2010; 
Schneider, 2013), are: the rise of the burden of taxes and social security 
contributions; increased regulation in the official economy; trust in the justice 
system and the parliament; earlier retirement; unemployment and self-
employment; quality of State institutions; corruption; and tax morale. Williams & 
Schneider (2016) refer two major perspectives that can explain the level and 
nature of employment in the shadow economy in terms of the type of regulatory 
regime in a country. One is the neo-liberal perspective, which argues that 
employment in the shadow economy directly results from high taxes, corruption 
and state interference in the free market, while there is also the political economy 
perspective, which considers the deregulatory regime and inadequate levels of 
state intervention to provide social protection as the main causes for the 
existence of shadow economy, so it is always possible to consider a multitude of 
possible causes that explain the shadow economy, according to the analyzed 
country and one’s perceptions. Moreover, Williams & Schneider (2016) also 
present a survey about the extent and nature of shadow employment in EU-27 to 
analyze whether shadow employment was carried out for exit or exclusion 
rationales9, concluding that, in Portugal, 67% of shadow employment was driven 
by exclusion, while only 33% for exit rationales, which goes in line with other 
southern European countries results.  
                                                                
9 Exclusion rationales indicate that one could not find a regular job or had no other alternative, while exit means that the 
individual perceived the existence of too much bureaucracy or too high taxes/social security contributions.  
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Even though this study will be more focused on the influence that economic 
factors have on the shadow economy, it is also important to mention that these 
can only partly explain the existence and growth of it. The social and political 
factors are also determinant to consider when shadow economy is measured 
(Losby et al, 2002). Regardless the type of shadow economy driving force, it is 
noteworthy that these variables, in empirical terms, can be subject to endogeneity 
issues, therefore, they must be seen as an indicative evidence (Bovi, 2003). 
The burden of tax and social security contributions 
Tax burden can be defined as the ratio of State tax revenues over personal 
income. Social security burden is defined as the ratio of social security 
contributions over personal income. Taxes affect labor-leisure choices and 
stimulate labor supply in the shadow economy, so the bigger the difference 
between the total cost of labor in the official economy and the after-tax earnings, 
the greater is the incentive to avoid this difference and participate in the shadow 
economy (Schneider, 2002; Schneider & Klinglmair, 2004). 
The burden of tax and social security contributions is often considered as the 
key determinant in the existence of the shadow economy (Frey & Schneider, 
2000; Schneider & Enste, 2000; Schneider, 2002, 2013). Schneider (1994) says 
that the direct tax burden (including social security payments) had the biggest 
influence, from all factors, as the driving force for the shadow economy activities, 
nonetheless he also concluded that a major reduction in the direct tax burden 
would not necessarily lead to a similar reduction in the shadow economy.  
Generally, if tax burden increases in a country, economic units move from 
formal economy to informal economy over time. This is partly explained by 
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Laffer10. After a certain point, which can vary across different countries, the 
optimal level is reached and the tax revenue starts to decrease.  
Unemployment and self-employment 
Unemployment is usually associated with a decrease in a country’s GDP11, 
imposing costs to the society and contributing to instability and less employment 
in the formal economy, which ends up driving people who have difficulty to find a 
job to engage in the shadow economy. 
Feld & Schneider (2010) and Schneider & Williams (2013) assume that the 
higher the unemployment12 and self-employment rates are, the more activities 
can be performed in the shadow economy, ceteris paribus. In fact, Schneider 
(2013) studied the average relative impact of the shadow economy determinants 
in 38 OECD countries (Table VII), concluding that self-employment had the biggest 
impact on the Portuguese shadow economy. However, the figures about 
unemployment cannot be considered only as a cause. The fact that one can 
observe such high and persistent unemployment in the EU throughout the years 
may be explained by a significant level of shadow labor market activity in these 
countries, as well (Schneider & Williams, 2013). 
Corruption and Institutional Quality 
OECD (2007) defines corruption as the “abuse of public or private office for 
personal gain”, which is considered by United Nations (2008) as “the single 
greatest obstacle to economic and social development”. An efficient and 
discretionary application of the tax code and regulations by the government plays 
                                                                
10 See Laffer’s Curve (1974). 
11 See Okun’s Law (1962). 
12 A deeper study about the impact of the unemployment on the shadow economy can be found in Bajada 
& Schneider (2009). 
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a crucial role in the decision to work underground, while bureaucracy associated 
with highly corrupt government officials is usually associated with a larger shadow 
economy (Schneider & Buehn, 2017). To demonstrate this, Johnson et al (1999) 
found that a one-point increase in the corruption index13 was associated with a 
5.1 percent point decrease in the unofficial economy, ceteris paribus. Empirical 
studies from Dreher et al (2005) showed that institutional quality can reduce the 
shadow economy and corruption, at the same time. This positive correlation may 
reflect peoples’ overall perceptions of a country’s institutional environment – if 
public institutions and government officials reveal low levels of corruption, 
shadow economy tends to be lower, and vice-versa, suggesting that the quality 
of the institutions and the size of the shadow economy go hand in hand (Friedman 
et al, 2000). This becomes especially true when one considers the endogenous 
linkage between institutional quality and taxation, tested by Loayza (1997) and 
Friedman et al (2000). Thus, the bigger the distance perception of tax payers 
between what they pay to the State and what they get from it, the bigger their 
predisposition is to engage in the shadow economy (Gonçalves, 2016). Tanzi 
(1998) refers that countries like Portugal have managed to reduce the incidence 
of corruption significantly14, considering the existence of an inversely proportional 
relationship between the development level of a country and corruption-bribery 
which, therefore, may affect the size of the shadow economy. 
In sum, bureaucracy with highly corrupt government officials tends to be 
associated with larger unofficial activity, while a good application of laws through 
securing property rights and contract enforceability increases the benefits of 
                                                                
13 This index ranks between 0 and 10 (10 means an absence of corruption). 
14 In 2016, Portugal ranked 29th, out of 176 countries, in the Corruption Perception Index, released by 
Transparency International. 
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being engaged in the formal economy, given the fact that a certain level of 
taxation, mostly spent in productive public services, characterizes efficient 
policies. Hence, production in the formal sector benefits from higher provision of 
productive public services and is negatively affected by taxation, while the 
shadow economy reacts in the opposite way (Schneider & Buehn, 2017). As 
Gonçalves (2016) notes by saying that fraud (including corruption) usually 
precede, follow or succeed shadow economy, even though shadow economy can 
exist without fraud and fraud without shadow economy. 
Tax Morale & Deterrence 
Tax morale is defined by OECD (2013) as the motivation of an individual to pay 
its taxes. Deterrence is the probability of being audited and the height of the 
penalty which, according to Schneider (2011) can also impact on the intrinsic 
motivation to pay taxes. In this way, the former is influenced by the latter, so there 
is always a reciprocal link between the two, but it is also influenced by the quality 
of state institutions and constitutional differences among states (Schneider, 
2011). 
Tax morale is particularly affected by the efficiency of the public sector, since 
it has an indirect effect on the size of the shadow economy (Schneider & Buehn, 
2017). However, citizens are willing to honestly declare income, even if they do 
not receive a full public good equivalent to their tax payments, if the political 
process is perceived to be fair and legitimate, representing an interaction 
between taxpayers and the government with an establishment of a fair, reciprocal 
exchange that involves giving and taking of both parties, with the government 
providing public services to citizens in exchange for their tax payments (Feld & 
Frey, 2007). 
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3.3. Consequences of the Shadow Economy 
 
The debate about the influence that shadow economy represents in the economy 
of a nation is not recent, with some authors mentioning its benefits and some 
others its disadvantages.  
The shadow economy mitigates government-induced distortions and, as a 
result, leads to enhanced economic activities in the official sector. In this sense, 
it is possible to say that the presence of the unofficial sector plays as a 
complement to the official economy rather than a substitute (Choi & Thum, 2005). 
One could say that the elimination of the shadow economy would benefit the 
economy and society as whole, but studies demonstrate that this sentence 
cannot be considered as an obvious consequence. It is not very straightforward 
that the shadow economy can also have a positive side, but it might take place in 
certain conditions. Schneider (2013) assumes that two thirds of all activities in the 
shadow economy complement those in the official sector, since that amount 
returns to the official economy via consumption (Schneider, 2002), concluding 
that the development of the shadow economy can lead to higher value-added 
figures, given the fact that total GDP is formed by the official GDP and part of the 
shadow economy GDP. This is particularly true in developed countries, like 
Portugal, but the same does not apply to developing countries where shadow 
economy already represents a large portion of the official economy, so there 
would not exist any major positive effect to the official GDP (Gonçalves, 2016). 
Considering these facts, if shadow economy disappeared or suffered a huge 
decline, it would only improve a country’s total welfare if almost all of it was 
transferred to the official economy (Schneider, 2013). 
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On the negative side, an increase of the shadow economy results in lower 
tax revenues and, consequently, in a lower amount of public services and goods 
available. The erosion of tax and social security bases not only cause significantly 
large budget deficits, but they also cause an inefficiency of the Government 
policies, which are a consequence of unreliable indicators (Dreher et al, 2005). 
This erosion is partly explained by the existence of undeclared work which, 
according to European Commission (2007), tends to obstruct growth-oriented 
economic, budgetary and social policies. This is particularly harmful to the social 
security system when one decides to enter in the informal economy while 
receiving social security benefits, since it creates a system responsibility without 
creating a system financing source (Gonçalves, 2016). Considering that public 
infrastructure has a key role on economic growth (Loayza, 1997), the idea that a 
country may face a decrease of economic growth related with a growth of the 
shadow economy might become true. Loayza (1997) finds some evidence about 
this by studying the correlation between the shadow economy and economic 
growth, in which he finds that the relative size of the informal sector is negatively 
correlated with the rate of economic growth while empirically states that an 
increase in the size of the informal sector negatively affects growth by reducing 
the availability of public services and by increasing the number of activities that 
use some of the existing public services less efficiently or not at all. In fact, the 
growth of the shadow economy represents a huge risk to public sectors which, 
obviously, depends on the tax and social security contributions to keep the 
protective welfare state running smoothly. This growth represents less revenue 
and, consequently, an additional pressure on public finance, reducing the quality 
and quantity of publicly provided goods and services. This can lead to increased 
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tax rates in the official sector, often combined with deterioration in the quality of 
public goods and of the administration, with the consequence of even stronger 
incentives to participate in the shadow economy (Schneider & Enste, 2000), 
resulting in a snowball effect. 
3.4. Mitigation solutions 
 
Shadow economy is often considered as a debilitating force that weakens the 
official economy by attracting factors of production away from the official 
economy and creating unfair competition for official firms. As such, most countries 
attempt to control underground economic activities through various punitive 
measures, rather than through reforms of the tax and social security systems 
(Schneider & Enste, 2000). In order to study different ways to mitigate shadow 
economy, CEGEA (2008) referred two essential principles. The first one was 
easing the tax compliance burden, considering that people tend to associate 
excessive costs and difficulty to tax compliance. The second one was the combat 
of the sense of impunity by those who are engaged in the shadow economy, since 
there is a general feeling that the non-compliance would not be punished at all or 
the probability of getting caught was too low. Cebula (1996) empirically concluded 
that the size of the shadow economy might be diminished by increased IRS audits 
and penalties, but the evidence also suggests that an exclusive reliance on 
deterrence is not a reasonable strategy to increase tax compliance (Feld & Frey, 
2007). Research has shown that people’s decisions to participate in the shadow 
economy are barely influenced by detection rates15, but depend much more on 
other factors like acceptance of the tax system, perceived values, and the overall 
                                                                
15 According to Table IX, in Portugal, almost half of the surveyed participants perceive a high risk of detection, 
even though the Portuguese shadow economy has a considerable size. 
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situation in the labor market (Feld & Schneider, 2010). However, if the population 
perceives the existence of tax evasion without penalties, it will increase the sense 
of injustice among those who pay their taxes, which eventually leads to an 
increase of the shadow economy (Bairrada & Martins, 2008). Gonçalves (2016) 
suggests a more pragmatic way of reducing shadow economy, by knowing who 
is engaged in the shadow economy and how is it being done. In this way, the 
author mentions that companies and wealthier individuals are those who more 
often participate in shadow economy, so any attention from authorities should be 
more targeted to bigger fiscal frauds and capital flights, rather than smaller 
businesses, even though these should not be left out, too. 
To mitigate the movement of workers to the shadow economy and increase 
social protection coverage, some nations with prominent level of shadow 
economy and environments in which most employment relations are informal, 
created a system of matching contributions, providing some incentives for greater 
participation in the formal labor market and therefore the pension system (BBVA, 
2012), focused on individuals who would otherwise have no coverage at all. 
However, in countries like Colombia and Peru, the results were disappointing. 
Not only coverage remained low, but became still lower. It is still too early to 
develop some deeper conclusions about these programs, but Hinz et al (2013) 
consider that matching is moderately effective in increasing program participation 
but not generally measurably effective in raising contributions and thus benefit 
levels. 
In sum, shadow economy cannot be tackled simply by increasing the 
probability of detection and increasing the level of penalties, since these only 
deals with the effects rather than causes of the problem (Williams & Schneider, 
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2016). The strengthening of institutions and tax morale plays a crucial role in the 
mitigation of the shadow economy, as well. 
4. Shadow Economy and Social Security  
 
Shadow economy is a phenomenon present in all economies, regardless of their 
development, being considered as a main concern to the national authorities and 
institutions. In terms of influence from a macroeconomic perspective, it decreases 
tax revenues and undermines the financing of social security systems (European 
Commission, 2007). According to Schneider (2014), by definition, every activity 
in the shadow economy involves a “shadow labor market” to some extent. Hence, 
this labor market includes all cases, where the employees or the employers, or 
both, are engaged in the shadow economy. Besides the effect that shadow 
economy has on the social security system sustainability, it is also important to 
notice how the social security system can affect shadow economy. According to 
Bajada & Schneider (2009), a large and prolonged participation in the shadow 
economy by the unemployed not only distorts the intended equitable distribution 
of social security system, but it can also engender what they call as “dependency 
trap”, if shadow economy income (when supplemented by social security 
payments), discourages active participation in the formal economy. However, 
even though the social security burden is considered to be one of the main driving 
forces of the shadow economy, social contributions have never shown a positive 
correlation with the shadow economy (Bovi, 2003), so the effect of this variable 
is not straightforward. In fact, associated costs noticed by economic agents by 
the time they plan to engage in shadow economy activity, seem to prevent them 
of doing so. This applies both to the employees’ and employers’ side. Regarding 
the former one, if social contributions are considered to be fair and faced as a 
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future wage, while having the perception that if by engaging the shadow 
economy, will possibly lose social benefits, it will exist the incentive to pay them 
(Bovi, 2003). While the latter one, considering that social contributions contribute 
to higher productivity and are an appreciated source of credit (Bovi, 2003), will 
possibly not feel tempted to go underground. The costs of participating in the 
informal sector, also known as costs of concealment are usually modelled in 
terms of exclusion from certain public goods and services (e.g., social 
infrastructure, property rights and the justice system) (Blackburn et al, 2012). In 
fact, according to Table X, the inexistence of social security entitlements was 
considered, by Southern Europe citizens, where Portugal is also included, the 
major consequence of working in shadow economy. 
Brown (2008) defines three main priorities of a well-designed social security 
pension system: the mitigation and alleviation of poverty amongst the elderly; to 
help citizens maintain an acceptable standard of living post-retirement; and 
solidarity. Brown (2008) referred solidarity as the desire of workers and 
employers to contribute and support the social security system. To achieve it, he 
assumes that there should not be a substantial proportion of workers who do not 
participate and benefit from the system, at the same time. Shadow economy 
assumes a key role on this. If people perceive that the total of taxes and social 
security contributions are too high16 and do not benefit enough from the system, 
they will end up entering the shadow economy. As such, social security system 
should not create what Brown (2008) defines as “perverse economic incentives”, 
which may lead people to do it. However, the implementation of an effective social 
                                                                
16 According to Brown (2008), “too high” depends from time to time and culture to culture, even though there 
is always a limit on the total of taxes and contributions applied. 
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security system should always be subject to a deep analysis by the policy makers. 
If the level of generosity is too low, the social security system fails to maintain 
adequate support for those experiencing financial hardship while on the other 
hand, a very generous system may encourage welfare dependency (Bajada & 
Schneider, 2009). 
Williams & Schneider (2016) computations suggest a strong statistically 
significant correlation between a greater level of social protection expenditure 
and a low level of employment in the shadow economy, in the EU-27. To analyze 
this relationship, it was decided to test how the Portuguese social security system 
expenditures could affect the size of shadow economy. 
5. Data & Methods 
This empirical investigation was developed on a sample composed by a single 
country (Portugal) and a period of 33 years, to test theoretical assumptions. It is 
important to mention that the main obstacle for empirical analysis regarding 
shadow economy is the availability and reliability of the data. Considering shadow 
economy is a complex phenomenon, its measurability proves to be extremely 
challenging. In this aspect, the study relied almost entirely on data provided by 
PORDATA. This section will be dedicated to discussing the data used for the 
estimation and the econometric approach. 
Data 
In order to proceed with this test, all the variables were chosen based on the 
most relevant causal variables presented by Schneider & Buehn (2013) (Table 
VII), while Table VIII shows all the data collected regarding Portugal. Even though 
there were older records (some since 1977), the sample period starts from 1983 
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until 2015, in order to harmonize17 all the data available provided by PORDATA, 
considering that the records regarding some of the variables were only available 
since that year. A big amount of observations is crucial for this type of research, 
which is the main reason why it was decided to collect the older data one could 
get. However, the lack of available data resulted in a small sample size. 
Therefore, it was also decided to dedicate a part of this empirical chapter to do a 
brief inferential statistical analysis, testing how welfare policies can affect shadow 
economy size. Nevertheless, meaningful findings are produced. In this study, all 
model estimations were implemented in the statistical software package STATA. 
Econometric Specification  
Two main models are estimated. The first one is a bivariate regression where the 
specification is given below: 
Model 1 
𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 +  𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡 
𝛽𝛽1 represents the coefficient of interest, which gives the marginal impact of social 
security spending on the shadow economy. However, considering that 𝛽𝛽1 might 
be biased, since there are other factors that can also explain the shadow 
economy size these were also added as control variables by running a 
multivariate regression. The exact equational specification is given below: 
Model 2  
𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 =  𝛽𝛽0 +  𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 +
𝛽𝛽2𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽𝛽3 𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 +
 𝛽𝛽4𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑡𝑡  + 𝛽𝛽5𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽𝛽6𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑌𝑌𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹 + 𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡  
                                                                
17 This only applies to the variables used in the econometric study. 
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Where Dummy = 1, from 2003 onwards, which allows the correction of any 
systematic difference that the change of the author regarding shadow economy 
size data from 2002 to 2003 could cause. While the variable Year controls year 
effects. 
6. Results 
In order to test the proposed relation, Figure 3 compares the evolution between 
two variables – social security expenditure (% GDP) and shadow economy size 
(% of official GDP), in Portugal, during the analyzed period. It is possible to 
observe opposite trends regarding the two variables. While social security 
expenditure seems to increase throughout the years, shadow economy seems to 
decrease, which would corroborate William & Schneider’s theory. Figure 4 seems 
to transmit another perspective. By inserting a polynomial trend line, it is possible 
to observe that the marginal effect of social security expenditure increase on the 
reduction of shadow economy seems to work until the 17.5% threshold, 
approximately. After this, the result becomes negative and shadow economy 
increases, again. This seems to go in line with what Schneider & Enste (2000) 
refer – considering that social welfare size would be directly linked to the social 
security spending amount, more social transfers would lead to stronger negative 
incentives for beneficiaries to work in the official economy. The authors mention 
the disincentives that these systems provide for individuals receiving welfare 
payments to search for work in the official economy, by the fact that their overall 
income is higher if they receive these transfers while working in the underground 
economy. So, the positive effect of an increase of social transfers to mitigate 
shadow economy seems to disappear after a certain point. What if one adds 
different welfare components like education and health spending to this 
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comparison? Is there any kind of relation between these variables and a decrease 
of the shadow economy? By comparing Figure 5 with Figure 6, one could say that 
education expenditure seems to be a more effective way of reducing shadow 
economy, ceteris paribus, than increasing health expenditure. Berrittella (2015), 
whose results emphasize the role of education on decreasing shadow economy 
size, suggests that policies devoted to a higher education level imply a 
decreasing effect on the shadow economy. Berrittella (2015) considers that as 
education increases wage rates, it increases the opportunity costs of participating 
in shadow economy and the effect that it has on social and moral dynamics, which 
can cause a positive impact on individuals’ tax morale. To test the relation 
between social welfare policies and shadow economy it was also decided to 
compare them through a scatter plot with shadow economy size and at-risk-of-
poverty rate after social transfers (less data was available, causing a smaller 
sample). Figure 7 seems to indicate another time that the role of social transfers in 
reducing poverty can have a negative impact on shadow economy until a certain 
point, which goes in line with the conclusions about Figure 4. Therefore, it seems 
that policy makers should not only be focused on economic measures to reduce 
shadow economy but also (and probably more important) on how public 
institutions quality and the application of these measures is perceived by citizens, 
considering that the rationales that explain the engagement in the shadow 
economy are only partly explained by fiscal and economic factors. This situation 
is particularly perceived by the size of the shadow economy in different countries. 
Those with small public sectors and comparatively high tax morale (like the US 
and Switzerland) are also the ones with the smallest shadow economies 
(Schneider & Enste, 2000; Schneider, 2002), which might indicate a possible 
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relation between the two variables. Nevertheless, social transfers allied with a 
proper level of investment in public services seem to be truly effective on the 
reduction of shadow economy. 
Table V shows that the size of shadow economy is, on average, 21% with a 
healthy degree of variation, later explained through a regression analysis. The 
main explanatory variable of interest is the social security spending as a 
proportion of the official GDP. Column 1 and column 2 from Table VI estimates 
Model 1 and Model 2. While, column 3 provides an estimation of Model 2 with 
Newey-West (1987) correction.  
By calibrating model (2) with values given in column (3), the following 
equation is provided: 
𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 =  7.498 −  0.224 𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 +
 0.438 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 + 0.0112 𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 −
 0.221 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑡𝑡−0.0432 𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑝𝑝𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + 0.0311 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 −
 0.00366 𝑌𝑌𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 +  𝜖𝜖𝑡𝑡  
Interpreting the above equation gives the answer to the proposed research 
question. The relevant coefficient is 𝛽𝛽1, which gives the marginal impact of social 
security spending on the shadow economy. The preferred results are presented 
in Table VI – Column 3. It is possible to conclude that a 1 percentage point increase 
in social security expenditure results in a 0.224 percentage point decrease in the 
size of the shadow economy, ceteris paribus. These results corroborate the 
computations carried out by Williams & Schneider (2016) that were previously 
mentioned. However, unemployment seems to exert a much bigger effect, since 
a 1 percentage point increase in unemployment rate results in a 0.438 percentage 
point increase in the size of the shadow economy, ceteris paribus. 
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Moreover, it is possible to observe that a great degree of variation is 
explained by the explanatory variable. In other words, the adjusted R-squared is 
about 91.2% which means that the explanatory variable explains about 91.2% of 
the variation in the dependent variable. However, it is also deeply important to 
mention that this relation can only be done when all the other factors are held 
fixed, especially when one discusses an issue like shadow economy which is 
caused by a multitude of non-economic factors, so the fact that one finds an 
association between two or more variables might be suggestive, unless causality 
can be established, it is rarely compelling (Wooldridge, 2015). 
It was also decided to run a few regression diagnostics and tests to evaluate 
the quality of the proposed model. First, a Fisher test is done to see if the model 
is jointly significant - testing if it is statistically relevant to choose these particular 
control and explanatory variables in this regression. The Fisher test (Figure 8) 
reveals a F-statistic of 36.80 and an associated p-value of less than 0.01, implying 
that the joint significance of the main regressors is extremely statistically precise. 
Therefore, the model seems to be jointly significant and indicates the statistical 
power of the model selected. Hence, the chosen explanatory variables seem to 
be statistically related to the size of shadow economy. The particularly high F-
statistic and a very low p-value provide confidence that the chosen model 
explains an important variation in the data and that coefficients are statistically 
different from zero. Afterwards, a Breusch-Pagan test (Figure 9) is conducted to 
check whether the residuals are heteroskedastic. Gauss-Markov assumptions 
stipule that if residuals are heteroskedastic then OLS standard errors will be 
biased, which would mean that t-statistic would be inflated, being that a cause of 
concern. Considering the results, it is not possible to conclude that there is 
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heteroskedasticity in model 2 when standard errors are computed without 
correction. Therefore, the Gauss-Markov homoscedastic error terms assumption 
is not violated since the test seems to demonstrate that error terms do have 
constant variance, i.e. the null of constant error term variance is not rejected with 
a p-value being 0.1913. The results of column (3) in Table VI are as valid as the 
naïve estimation of model 2 in column (2). Similar results are found when a more 
generalized test of heteroskedasticity is used, like the information matrix test 
(Cameron & Trivedi, 1990) (Figure 10). 
In conclusion, the joint statistical significance and diagnostic testing reveal 
that social security spending indeed exerts a statistically strong and negative 
impact on the size of shadow economy.  
7. Conclusions and Future Research 
 
The role of social security in reducing poverty and inequalities cannot be denied. 
Ending with the shadow economy seems to be a utopia, even though it seems 
possible to decrease its dimension and adverse effects.  
Almost half of the Portuguese population inquired stated that the risk of being 
detected in shadow economy is high, so more than increasing deterrence it 
seems that there is a bigger gap to fill in terms of tax morale. A balance between 
an acceptable level of taxes applied to the citizens and a provision of public 
services from equivalent quality which makes people perceive their contributions 
are being applied correctly can be seen as one of the most important things to 
decrease shadow economy. However, the possible mitigation of the shadow 
economy may not have the positive outcome expected, since Schneider (2013) 
assumes that two thirds of all activities in the shadow economy complement those 
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in the official sector, assuming a complementary role rather than a substitute one 
(Choi & Thum, 2005). Although, from a theoretical perspective, it seems that both 
employers and employees recognize the positive effect that their social security 
payments can have in their future, since both benefit from them. 
The lack of reliable data regarding such a controversial and obscure issue 
plus the difficult measurement of something that is deeply influenced by people’s 
perceptions conducted to an empirical model that might not exactly correspond 
to reality, contributing to its limitation, even though it was possible to take several 
conclusions from it. It was possible to observe a considerable relation between 
an increase of the social security expenditure and a consequent decrease in 
shadow economy, either doing inferential statistics or econometric analysis. 
In the end, shadow economy not only represents a threat to the social 
security sustainability, but it also causes macroeconomic data distortions which, 
consequently, will affect policymaker’s decisions. Civil society, who suffers most 
with the associated costs, plays a major role in this. On the one hand, there is an 
urgent need to demand responsibility for wrong policies that lead people and 
companies to engage shadow economy, while on the other hand, citizens should 
not be accomplices to this behavior, either by option or need. Possible solutions 
to the financial problems of the social security system by trying to mitigate shadow 
economy will never be successful until more attention is paid to the field of social 
policy and the impact of economic decisions that affect it. Based on this, 
understanding the dichotomy shadow/official economy and what leads society to 
choose one of the sides seems to be the most challenging future task, either 
economically, sociologically or otherwise. 
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Annexes 
 
FIGURE 1 – SOCIAL SECURITY REVENUE/EXPENDITURE (% GDP) (SOURCE: PORDATA) 
 
FIGURE 2 – CONTRIBUTIONS IN TOTAL OF SOCIAL SECURITY REVENUE (%) (SOURCE: PORDATA) 
 
FIGURE 3 – SOCIAL SECURITY EXPENDITURE AND SHADOW ECONOMY SIZE EVOLUTION (1983-2015) 
(SOURCE: AUTHOR’S CALCULATIONS) 
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FIGURE 4 – RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SHADOW ECONOMY SIZE AND SOCIAL SECURITY EXPENDITURE (1983-
2015) (SOURCE: AUTHOR’S CALCULATIONS) 
 
FIGURE 5 – RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SHADOW ECONOMY SIZE AND EDUCATION EXPENDITURE (1983-2015) 
(SOURCE: AUTHOR’S CALCULATIONS) 
 
FIGURE 6 – RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SHADOW ECONOMY SIZE AND HEALTH EXPENDITURE (1983-2015) 
(SOURCE: AUTHOR’S CALCULATIONS) 
 
FIGURE 7 – RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SHADOW ECONOMY SIZE AND AT-RISK-OF-POVERTY RATE AFTER SOCIAL 
TRANSFERS (1994-2015) (AUTHOR’S CALCULATIONS) 
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FIGURE 8 – FISHER TEST OUTPUT (SOURCE: STATA 13) 
 
FIGURE 9 – BREUSCH-PAGAN TEST OUTPUT (SOURCE: STATA 13) 
 
FIGURE 10 – INFORMATION MATRIX TEST OUTPUT (SOURCE: STATA 13)  
TABLE I – GLOBAL FORMATION RATE 
Share 
Indexed reference remuneration to the Indexante dos 
Apoios Sociais – IAS 
Rates 
1 Up to 1.1 x IAS 2.3% 
2 Above 1.1 x IAS until 2 x IAS 2.25% 
3 Above 2 x IAS until 4 x IAS 2.2% 
4 Above 4 x IAS until 8 x IAS 2.1% 
5 Above 8 x IAS 2% 
Source: Social Security website, available at: http://www.seg-social.pt/pensao-de-velhice 
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TABLE II – CONTRIBUTIVE SYSTEM – TOTAL REVENUE/EXPENDITURE 
Total Revenue 19,753,910.3* 
Total Expenditure 17,896,109.3* 
Final Balance 1,857,801.0* 
Source: Instituto de Gestão Financeira da Segurança Social, I.P. (2017). Values in thousands of Euros* 
TABLE III – SHADOW ECONOMY IN 2015 – PORTUGAL 
Shadow Economy in 2015 (% GDP) (1)  17.6% 
Portuguese GDP in 2015 (2) 179,504,330* 
Shadow Economy in 2015 (absolute value) 31,592,762* 
Source: (1) Schneider (2015); (2) PORDATA. Values in thousands of Euros* 
TABLE IV - DIFFERENT COMPONENTS OF THE SHADOW ECONOMY 
  Monetary Transactions Non-monetary Transactions 
Illegal 
Activities 
Trade in stolen goods, drugs; manufacture of 
drugs; prostitution, gambling, fraud 
Barter, drugs, 
stolen goods, 
etc. 
Produce or 
grow drugs 
for own use. 
Theft for own 
use. 
  Tax Evasion Tax Avoidance Tax Evasion Tax Avoidance 
Legal 
Activities 
Unreported income from 
self-employment, 
wages, salaries, and 
assets 
Employee discounts, 
fringe benefits (cars, 
subsidized food, etc.) 
Barter of legal 
services and 
goods. 
Do-it-yourself 
work 
Source: Lippert & Walker (1997) 
TABLE V – SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Variable Observations Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Year 33 - - 1983 2015 
Dependent Variable      
   Shadow Economy (% of official GDP) 33 0,210 0,028 0,176 0,276 
Independent Variable      
   Social Security Expenditure (% GDP) 33 0,117 0,050 0,064 0,268 
Control Variables      
   Unemployment Rate 33 0,077 0,033 0,039 0,162 
   Indirect Taxes (% of total taxes) 33 0,590 0,039 0,520 0,712 
   Real GDP Growth Rate 33 0,020 0,028 -0,040 0,079 
   Self-employment (% total employment) 33 0,242 0,022 0,179 0,271 
Source: STATA 13 
SHADOW ECONOMY AND THE PORTUGUESE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM. 
48 
 
TABLE VI – REGRESSION RESULTS 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Column 3 
Social Security expenditure (% GDP) -0.319*** -0.224* -0.224* 
 (0.0832) (0.130) (0.113) 
Unemployment Rate  0.438*** 0.438*** 
  (0.128) (0.128) 
Indirect Taxes (% of total taxes)  0.0112 0.0112 
  (0.0648) (0.0723) 
Real GDP Growth Rate  -0.221** -0.221** 
  (0.0868) (0.0953) 
Self-employment (% total employment)  0.0432 0.0432 
  (0.151) (0.130) 
Dummy  0.0311*** 0.0311*** 
  (0.00814) (0.00752) 
Year  -0.00366*** -0.00366*** 
  (0.000637) (0.000622) 
Constant 0.248*** 7.498*** 7.498*** 
 (0.0106) (1.285) (1.257) 
Observations 33 33 33 
R-squared 0.322 0.912 0.912 
Source: STATA 13 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10% significance level. 
Column 3 has Newey West (1987) Robust Standard Errors  
TABLE VII – AVERAGE RELATIVE IMPACT (IN %) OF THE CAUSAL VARIABLES ON THE SHADOW 
ECONOMY OVER 1999 TO 2010 
Country 
Average 
size of the 
shadow 
economy 
Personal 
income 
tax 
Indirect 
taxes 
Tax 
morale Unemployment 
Self-
employment 
GDP 
Growth 
Business 
Freedom 
Australia 13.8 21.3 25.4 7.4 15.8 19.3 0.9 9.9 
Austria 9.8 18.5 27.4 11.6 12.1 20.5 0.8 9.1 
Belgium 21.5 19.2 20.2 19.1 16.5 17.3 0.4 7.2 
Bulgaria 34.6 5.1 37.7 5.7 25.9 17.5 1.9 6.2 
Canada 15.6 22.1 17.5 7.7 19.2 22.4 0.7 10.4 
Chile 19.4 1.8 35.3 5.5 17.3 32.7 0.8 6.7 
Cyprus 27.2 4.3 35.9 9.1 11.2 29.9 0.8 8.7 
Czech Rep. 17.6 7.8 30.7 9.4 19.0 23.5 1.2 8.3 
Denmark 17.3 34.6 33.5 4.0 9.5 9.9 0.3 8.2 
Estonia 21.7 10.0 36.0 11.7 21.8 10.4 1.8 8.3 
Finland 17.4 19.7 29.1 8.7 18.6 15.2 0.8 7.9 
France 14.8 12.8 24.3 15.5 23.2 15.1 0.4 8.6 
Germany 15.7 16.6 24.2 8.3 24.3 16.9 0.6 9.1 
Greece 27.0 5.8 21.8 10.4 18.0 37.6 0.7 5.7 
Hungary 24.1 12.3 34.9 6.4 18.6 18.5 1.2 8.0 
Iceland 15.2 19.9 39.7 6.5 7.1 17.9 0.6 8.2 
Ireland 16.1 12.5 35.4 7.9 12.5 21.3 1.0 8.5 
Italy 26.9 15.6 18.9 9.0 18.6 31.0 0.1 6.8 
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Korea 26.3 5.7 27.3 3.4 9.8 44.3 1.4 8.0 
Latvia 22.2 8.2 32.3 13.3 23.3 14.6 1.8 6.6 
Lithuania 25.4 9.0 28.8 17.5 19.9 17.1 1.5 6.1 
Luxembourg 9.6 13.2 33.4 20.0 10.4 11.9 1.2 9.8 
Malta 27.3 5.9 39.7 3.2 20.0 21.2 0.8 9.3 
Mexico 30.0 2.3 42.1 10.2 5.9 33.8 0.4 5.3 
Netherlands 13.2 13.6 32.5 13.0 10.4 19.7 0.8 10.0 
New Zealand 12.2 21.8 25.4 8.4 11.9 22.9 0.6 9.1 
Norway 18.6 21.2 31.5 12.5 10.8 13.0 0.5 10.5 
Poland 26.4 6.1 27.8 7.8 26.1 25.7 1.3 5.3 
Portugal 22.7 8.1 29.9 8.7 14.6 31.1 0.4 7.2 
Romania 32.2 4.2 24.5 14.2 13.1 37.7 1.1 5.2 
Slovak Rep. 17.5 4.8 31.7 6.4 34.9 13.7 1.5 7.1 
Slovenia 25.2 9.6 33.9 9.6 15.4 21.7 1.2 8.6 
Spain 22.8 10.6 17.9 10.4 29.2 23.8 0.6 7.5 
Sweden 18.6 23.5 30.6 8.7 15.2 13.2 0.8 8.0 
Switzerland 8.3 17.7 30.7 9.0 9.6 23.8 0.5 8.7 
Turkey 30.6 4.9 31.4 0.7 16.4 41.4 0.6 4.6 
United Kingdom 12.5 18.2 30.8 8.1 14.3 18.0 0.6 9.9 
United States 8.7 27.5 5.1 13.2 22.0 16.0 0.9 15.4 
Average 20.3 13.1 29.4 9.5 16.9 22.2 0.9 8.1 
Source: Schneider & Buehn (2013)  
TABLE VIII – COLLECTED DATA FOR ANALYSIS 
Year 
(1) 
Shadow 
Economy 
(% of 
official 
GDP) 
(2) 
Unemployme
nt Rate 
(2) Social 
Security 
expenditure 
(% GDP) 
(2) 
Indirect 
Taxes 
(% of 
total 
taxes) 
(2) Real 
GDP 
Growt
h Rate 
(2) Self-
employm
ent (% 
total 
employm
ent) 
(2) 
Education 
expenditure 
(% GDP) 
(2) Health 
expenditu
re (% 
GDP) 
(2) At-risk-
of-poverty 
rate after 
social 
transfers 
1983 27.6% 7.6% 6.4% 57.8% 1.0% 24.1% 3.2% 2.6% - 
1984 27.6% 8.2% 6.5% 57.9% -1.0% 26.5% 3.1% 2.7% - 
1985 27.6% 8.5% 6.5% 55.7% 1.6% 26.0% 3.1% 3.0% - 
1986 24.6% 8.3% 7.3% 61.8% 3.3% 26.0% 3.3% 2.9% - 
1987 24.6% 6.8% 7.8% 71.2% 7.6% 26.6% 3.4% 2.8% - 
1988 24.6% 5.6% 7.7% 68.1% 5.3% 26.2% 3.6% 3.1% - 
1989 20.2% 5.0% 7.4% 62.8% 6.7% 25.8% 3.7% 3.1% - 
1990 20.2% 4.6% 7.5% 61.7% 7.9% 25.7% 3.7% 3.1% - 
1991 20.2% 4.1% 8.0% 59.0% 3.4% 26.7% 4.2% 3.4% - 
1992 21.9% 4.1% 8.5% 58.7% 3.1% 23.7% 4.5% 3.6% - 
1993 21.9% 5.5% 9.5% 59.9% -0.7% 24.2% 4.5% 3.9% - 
1994 21.9% 6.8% 9.1% 62.3% 1.5% 25.2% 4.4% 3.9% 23.0% 
1995 21.4% 7.1% 9.1% 61.0% 2.3% 25.8% 4.5% 3.4% 21.0% 
1996 21.4% 7.2% 9.3% 58.3% 3.5% 26.7% 4.7% 4.0% 22.0% 
1997 21.4% 6.7% 9.4% 57.8% 4.4% 27.1% 4.8% 3.9% 21.0% 
1998 18.5% 4.9% 9.5% 57.7% 4.8% 25.8% 4.8% 3.9% 21.0% 
1999 18.5% 4.4% 9.7% 58.0% 3.9% 24.8% 4.9% 4.1% 21.0% 
2000 18.5% 3.9% 9.6% 56.0% 3.8% 23.6% 4.8% 4.1% 20.0% 
2001 17.9% 4.0% 10.2% 56.7% 1.9% 24.7% 5.0% 4.3% 20.0% 
2002 17.9% 5.0% 12.6% 58.3% 0.8% 24.9% 5.1% 5.7% 19.0% 
2003 22.2% 6.3% 11.7% 60.6% -0.9% 25.1% 4.8% 4.3% 20.4% 
2004 21.7% 6.6% 12.3% 60.2% 1.8% 24.5% 4.7% 5.5% 19.4% 
2005 21.2% 7.6% 12.5% 62.2% 0.8% 23.8% 4.6% 5.9% 18.5% 
2006 20.1% 7.6% 12.4% 61.3% 1.6% 22.9% 4.4% 5.4% 18.1% 
2007 19.2% 8.0% 12.3% 58.6% 2.5% 23.2% 4.1% 5.2% 18.5% 
2008 18.7% 7.6% 15.0% 57.0% 0.2% 23.4% 4.1% 5.2% 17.9% 
2009 19.5% 9.4% 16.9% 56.0% -3.0% 23.2% 4.8% 5.5% 17.9% 
2010 19.2% 10.8% 17.3% 58.0% 1.9% 22.2% 4.8% 5.4% 18.0% 
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2011 19.4% 12.7% 16.7% 56.2% -1.8% 20.9% 4.5% 5.2% 17.9% 
2012 19.4% 15.5% 21.6% 57.4% -4.0% 21.4% 3.9% 6.2% 18.7% 
2013 19.0% 16.2% 26.8% 52.0% -1.1% 21.3% 4.2% 5.0% 19.5% 
2014 18.7% 13.9% 21.7% 52.7% 0.9% 19.2% 4.0% - 19.5% 
2015 17.6% 12.4% 18.4% 53.0% 1.6% 17.9% 3.8% - 19.0% 
Source: (1) Dell’Anno (2007) – 1983 to 2002; Schneider (2015) – 2003 to 2015; (2) PORDATA. 
TABLE IX – ASSESSMENT OF PERCEIVED RISK OF DETECTION, BY COUNTRY 
Country % stating high % stating small Refusal Don't know 
EU-28 36 53 2 9 
Lithuania 49 43 2 6 
UK 48 44 0 8 
Ireland 47 41 1 11 
Portugal 47 40 1 12 
Estonia 44 42 4 10 
Austria 41 44 4 11 
Italy 39 50 3 8 
Slovakia 39 53 1 7 
Hungary 39 46 4 11 
Poland 38 45 2 15 
Belgium 36 60 1 3 
Greece 36 57 2 5 
Denmark 34 64 0 2 
France 34 58 1 7 
Germany 34 56 2 8 
Croatia 33 59 2 6 
Luxembourg 32 54 3 11 
Finland 29 66 2 3 
Spain 29 58 1 12 
Romania 29 48 4 19 
Cyprus 28 67 1 4 
Latvia 28 62 2 6 
Netherlands 25 69 0 6 
Bulgaria 25 53 2 20 
Czech Republic 24 66 3 7 
Sweden 22 76 0 2 
Malta 20 57 1 22 
Slovenia 14 74 1 11 
Source: European Commission (2014) 
TABLE X – CONSEQUENCES OF WORKING IN SHADOW ECONOMY, BY EUROPEAN REGION (%) 
Country 
No social 
security 
entitlements 
Lack of 
insurance 
against 
accidents 
Harder 
physical 
working 
conditions 
than regular 
job 
Higher risk 
of losing job 
Higher risk of 
accidents 
compared with 
regular job 
EU-28 20 19 7 7 6 
Western 13 15 4 2 3 
East-Central 19 15 11 11 8 
Southern 37 34 8 15 11 
Nordic 16 19 8 5 7 
Source: European Commission (2014) 
 
